When “Employment” Begins
A recent writ denied case addressed the details of one of the defenses to psyche claims. Labor Code § 3208.3 provides that psyche claims can not proceed if the employee has been employed less than (not necessarily continuous) six months. The exception to this is a sudden and extraordinary event. An earlier blog post covers this exception.
The skinny: Employment starts with the first day of actual service – not the technical hire date, preparation dates, or anything else. If Employee is “hired” and begins work the next week, the next week is the first day of employment for purposes of § 3208.3.
In the case of Hamilton v. WCAB, applicant Jill Hamilton was hired on September 14, 2008 to work as a home mortgage assistant, and began work on September 15, 2008, all after filing an online application for the job on August 6, 2008. Applicant’s last day of work (and earning wages) was on March 12, 2009, and she was taken off the company books on January 25, 2010.
08/06/08– Applies for the job
09/14/08– Official hire date
09/15/08– First day of work
03/12/09– Last day of actual work/earning wages
01/25/10– Removed from company books
As in all things, timing is everything – had applicant started work just a few days earlier, her psyche claim would have survived § 3208.3.
Knowing this, applicant argued that in early September of 2008, she went, at her own expense, to an office in Ventura to pick up a laptop for her training program. Although she was not compensated for her time, she claimed that this was her first work-related act, so her “employment” commenced sometime (any time that it might please the court) before September 12, 2008.
The Workers’ Compensation Judge found that applicant began working more than six months before March 12, 2008, and therefore was entitled to proceed on her psyche claim.
The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board granted defendant’s petition for reconsideration, taking a position contrary to the WCJ’s. Relying on previous case law, the WCAB found that employment begins with actual work, and does not include time off for disability. Rather, what counts is the “days of actual service” and not those “days of employment where there was no actual performance of services.”
On appeal, applicant’s Petition for Writ of Review was denied.
Before you follow this next tidbit, bear in mind that this is a crazy idea and using it might incur ridicule, discipline, penalties, or even sanctions! Of course, if you pull this one off, your name will live forever in endless glory. When signing autographs, don’t forget to tell the fawning fans where you first got the idea for this maneuver. That being said, let’s walk down “what if” road.
What if we took the language of this opinion one step further. Averaging six months to 180 days, can we say that vacations, holidays, and weekends don’t count? Can we argue that applicant is barred against a psyche claim until he or she has worked an actual 180 days (not counting weekends, holidays, etc.?)
After all, if the job is causing a psyche claim, shouldn’t not being on the job slow the progress of the injury?
It’s unlikely to work, but could provide an interesting chance to test the limits of § 3208.3.