Happy MLK Day 2019!

And a good day to you dear readers!

As you likely know, today is a memorial day for Martin Luther King Junior, and, as such, many offices and government buildings tend to be closed.  If you are ever wondering if a given day is a state holiday such that would call for the closure of the WCAB you can always check this link.

As always California rules of court provide that if today would otherwise be the last day to do anything in particular the party required to act would receive an additional day.  So if you have been procrastinating, today really is your lucky day because you can turn in your homework tomorrow.

Additionally, if you were going to request a panel, today, as a holiday, should serve to kick your request forward one more day.

Now, as always, rain or shine, weekday or weekend, holiday or not, your humble blogger is slaving away to ensure that not one extra aspirin nor a single unnecessary box of tissues is paid for by the persecuted and oft hounded defendants in this wonderful world we call California Workers’ Compensation.

But don’t pack your bags for my little guilt trip just yet – if you have the chance to take today off I certainly hope you take it.  Lord knows the first three weeks of 2019 have fallen far short of a pleasure cruise.

Your humble blogger will see you here bright and early on Wednesday.

Weed and Loathing in Delaware

 

Happy Friday dear readers!  We’re about to delve into yet another long weekend, with Martin Luther King Jr. Day around the corner.

Well, before your focus on workers’ comp goes up in smoke (heads up, readers – that was a pun!) let’s talk about Marijuana (again).

I’m bringing you a story out of Delaware in which a Judge allowed a fired employee’s lawsuit to proceed against his employer based on Delaware’s Medical Marijuana Act.  The employee tested positive for marijuana following a company drug test.  He claims this violates the DMMA’s non-discrimination provisions, but the employer is claiming the act is preempted by federal law because marijuana is still illegal federally, for medical purposes or otherwise.

So why am I bringing this to your attention?  After all, we’re still enjoying our daily 12 hours of California winter sunshine, right?  Who cares what all those people do in Delaware – they don’t even have surfing!

Well, it matters here.  California doesn’t seem to be lit up (another pun – that’s your punishment!)  with such conflicts as yet – there’s a live and let smoke attitude so far.  But With marijuana now being decriminalized as per California law, what are employers supposed to do?

If an applicant’s doctor is providing modified duty which the employer can accommodate but is also recommending use of marijuana to manage his or her symptoms, is the employer supposed to bring the applicant back to work?

Say what you want about the restorative power of the noble weed, it can still impair one’s senses and reaction time and increase the odds of an injury to self or others, let alone property damage.  Do you really want the guy who is supposed to be strapping down the cargo on the flat-bed truck (or driving the forklift) smoking any time close to when the work is to be performed?

Unlike in Delaware, “puff puff pass” is still more like “puff puff? pass me your resignation letter” in California.

As of right now, no such law exists in California (that I can find anyways) and employers are still safe in “discriminating” against marijuana users.  However, the trend nationally seems to inch towards marijuana legalization/decriminalization.  I don’t think it will be too long before marijuana is treated by the federal government in a manner similar to alcohol or tobacco, and then that whole pre-emption argument turns to ash.

Remember – there was a time when marijuana was illegal under California law for any purpose.

pep farm weed meme

If that ever becomes the case, employers will have a difficult decision to make – I have several files open now where applicants are self-procuring marijuana and shunning the opioids being provided industrially.

While your humble blogger is all in favor of employees being able to treat themselves with marijuana at their own expense, and not being jailed for the same, I am firmly against compelling employers to continue to employ such workers against their own business interests.  I would urge my beloved readers to join me in monitoring any potential legislation of this sort to ensure California does not go the way of Delaware.

Have a great weekend!

Voc. Rehab Facility Charged w/ Fraud

Happy Wednesday, dear readers!  When I was growing up, the primary purpose in camels was to sling cigarettes to easily brainwashed kids looking to be cool.  Ever since the gubmn’t got involved in regulating smoking many of these poor animals are out of the job, with the few still employed focused on serving as humiliated mascots for Wednesday, also known as “hump day”.

Speaking of job retraining, just before Christmas WorkCompCentral reported on VABAD Inc. (dba Career Advancement Solutions), and the Santa Clara District Attorney’s charges against the organization and certain individuals related thereto in a fraud scheme.  The names of these individuals are not listed here as these are yet charges, and not convictions, but if you’re dying to know then a bit of diligent googling will give you the answers.

In any case, the DA has charged the defendants with charging billing carriers for retraining services that were never provided and for paying kickbacks for referrals.  If the charges are taken at face value, then VABAD/Career Advancement Solutions collected proceeds on some $1.6 million and paid over $300k of that in kickbacks.  As alleged, the defendants would collect the voucher money and convert some of it to cash for the injured workers, keeping the rest.

So what?  I mean, it’s just $6k – when you’re talking about exposure for a lifetime of medical care, it’s a drop in the bucket, right?  Remember, dear readers, the classic Kipling poem regarding Dane-Geld: “That if you once have paid him the Dane-geld you never get rid of the Dane.”

The attitude of paying out vouchers unnecessarily or not policing their use makes voucher fraud such a tempting target.  If applicant attorneys demanded an extra $6,000 on top of every settlement “just because” we’d balk at it.  But that’s what’s happening here – if a voc rehab entity is converting the $6,000 voucher into a $1,000 check (for example) for injured workers who have no intent in using the voucher anyway, then there’s plenty of incentive to pursue the voucher at every turn.

So, what can you do?

Is the facility “providing” the computer and demanding $1,000?  That’s a no-go because the voc rehab folks are not allowed to sell a computer to the injured worker.

Are they charging more for their classes than what’s listed on the EDD website?  Are the classes as submitted for approval to EDD for ETPL approval different in nature or price from what is being submitted to the insurer for approval?  Are the classes to be provided to the injured worker exceeding the work restrictions imposed by the treating physician or med-legal expert (for example, is the carpal-tunnel claimant who can’t type being given “word processing classes”?).

I know it seems like investigating and litigating these vouchers is a chore – it’s $6,000 to get rid of a file.  But the problem is that lax monitoring or enforcement is going to run up a bill much larger than $6,000 because it encourages more and more fraudulent demands.  By contrast, stiff enforcement of proper use of a voucher will discourage those that have no intention of benefiting from the re-training, and the voucher money might never be lost to the employer as the voucher might expire unused.

Your humble blogger is one of those old-fashioned folks that follows that oh-so-American maxim: “millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute.”  And so, however self-serving this must sound coming from a defense attorney, I urge my beloved readers to opt for thousands in litigation dollars, but not one cent for fraudulent vouchers.

 

No Change in IW’s Medical Circumstances Necessary to UR and Deny In-Home Medical Care

Welcome back from the weekend, dear readers! Isn’t 2019 flying right by?  It feels like it’s been 2 months since new years’ but it’s actually only been two weeks.  The cold will never stop, the sun will never come back, and in the back of your humble blogger’s mind plays that old song on repeat: “hello darkness my old friend… why are you here it’s 4 p.m. …?”

Anywho, to reward you for your loyalty in readership and discerning taste in subscription (I know that not just anyone is allowed to contaminate your e-mail inbox), I am going to tell you a little workers’ compensation secret.  If a defendant is providing a certain type of medical treatment, it is not allowed to stop unless there’s a change in medical circumstances.  That’s right! Look through the Labor Code and you won’t find it; search through the regs but it isn’t there!  That’s because this secret is just a figment of some applicant attorneys’ imaginations.  It is a myth, a fantasy, not unlike Keyser Soze, which is why it’s such a well-kept secret, of course.  (To be fair, dear readers, there is one WCJ’s ruling and a no-comment WCAB approval that supports this conclusion, but this is non-binding and has no regulatory or statutory authority that your humble blogger can find; it would appear that the case discussed in this blog post directly conflicts with any guidance provided by the Miramontes result.)

With that in mind, I bring to your attention the relatively recent panel decision in the matter of Gonzalez v. First Presbyterian Church of Santa Barbara.  Therein, an applicant sustained an admitted injury and resolved her case via stipulated award with open future medical.  The case was reopened via petition but that’s not really related to the issue at hand.

Defendant was providing home health care for more than four years.  When applicant’s treating physician submitted yet another request for continued home health care, the request was forwarded to UR which issued a timely denial.  Applicant made a timely request for IMR but also challenged the validity of the UR denial at an expedited hearing.  Defendant raised the issue of jurisdiction based on the WCAB’s decision in Dubon II.

After the expedited hearing, the WCJ ruled that as UR was timely, the WCAB had no jurisdiction to review the decision – it had to go to IMR if it was to go anywhere at all.

The WCAB in reviewing the decision, ruled that a defendant can terminate home health care services if they are no longer necessary, and UR is one method of proving that they are no longer reasonably necessary to cure or relieve from the effects of the injury.

So what’s the lesson to learn here?  Well for defendants it is an old one: UR and IMR trend towards cost containment, and, of course “a trend is your friend.”

But, believe it or not, there is a lesson here for applicants as well.  There is a difference between medical treatment and a medical treatment award.  Just like we all learned in law school (or in preschool for that matter) a promise is different than performance on the promise.

The workers’ compensation landscape is increasingly becoming one where obtaining a medical treatment award is getting easier, but getting actual treatment – whether because no doctor is willing to starve his or her family by accepting workers’ comp fee schedule or because UR and IMR are very aggressive – is getting harder and harder.

So, perhaps there is some sense in applicant attorneys encouraging their clients to C&R their claims.  An aspirin in the hand is worth two on your PTP’s RFA.

WCJ/WCAB/COA: Absent Evidence of Causation, At-Work Collapse Not AOE/COE

Pop-quiz, dear readers: a worker collapses on the job and ultimately expires.  No witnesses appear with an explanation of what happened – no trauma, no blows, no anything.  He just collapses and dies.

Does his widow receive death benefits through the workers’ comp system?

As everything in law… it depends.

Such were the facts, or fairly close thereto, in the matter of Perez v. Deardorff Jackson Co. a recent writ denied panel decision.

The decedent worked as a harvester for defendant and, on the alleged date of injury, collapsed in the field and fell unconscious.  At the hospital, his family advised his physicians that he had a history of untreated hypertension.  The relevant medical reports reflected that he was being seen for a “hypertension emergency … suspected of being secondary to amphetamines.”  An in-hospital drug screen showed methamphetamine use.

The decedent died in the hospital later that month, and the coroner listed cause of death as “sequelae of hypertensive stroke.”

An application was filed 364 days after the original injury and was timely denied by defendants on the basis of lack of evidence of industrial causation and the affirmative defense of intoxication.  After the matter was set for trial on the issue of AOE/COE and the intoxication defense, the WCJ found that the decedent (and his widow, the applicant) could not carry the burden of establishing industrial causation.

At trial, applicant argued that the case of Clemmens v. WCAB requires a death from a “mysterious cause” to be found industrial.  However, the WCJ reasoned that the Clemmens Court opined that when the likely cause of death from mysterious circumstances is neutral as to causation, it is acceptable to assume industrial causation in that the work activities exposed the deceased worker to harm.

By contrast, the immediate case was not neutral as to the causes – applicant had a history of untreated hypertension and a drug screen suggested methamphetamine use, suggesting a personal cause for the death.  While the contrary argument, that his physical exertions at work caused his death, would be an industrial cause for the death.  In either case, the WCJ reasoned, the Clemmens case is not applicable.

But what was applicable was Labor Code section 5705 – the burden proof rests on the party asserting the affirmative of the issue.  In this case, as it might be a toss-up, a who-done-it, a who-the-heck-can-say as to AOE/COE, applicant fails to carry her burden as to the cause of her deceased husband’s death.

Now, for those a bit farther away from the front lines at the Board, let me give you a taste of some of the prevailing logic in the negotiation rooms – “hey, if it’s a toss-up, the applicant wins so accept the case and pay up!”

Well, this blog brought to your attention the case of Lantz in which the Court of Appeal rejected the application of Labor Code section 3202 (“… shall be liberally construed by the courts with the purpose of extending their benefits for the protections of persons injured in the course of their employment”) until there had been a showing of compensability.

So, if it’s a real toss-up on the threshold issue of compensability, the Labor Code, the regs, the universe are all NOT liberally construed to hand a victory to the applicant.  The preponderance of evidence standard still applies!

After trial and a “take-nothing”, the WCAB denied reconsideration, adopting and incorporating the WCJ’s report on reconsideration.  At the end of November 2018, the Court of Appeal denied review.

Dr. Benjamin Cox Convicted of WC Fraud Billing

Happy Wednesday dear readers!

Your humble blogger was a big fan of the show Scrubs when it was on the air (and now, in DVD form!).  The show ran for eight glorious seasons and then 1 disastrous thing which we should all agree right now has nothing to do with the original show.

One of the most loveable characters on there was Perry Cox, M.D., expertly portrayed by actor John C. McGinley, who brought to life a cranky but competent physician that earned the trust of his colleagues and patients.

Well, the name of this fictional physician was sullied not to long about by a different Dr. Cox.  Benjamin G. Cox, M.D., was convicted in October, 2018 by a jury of his peers.  The District Attorney had alleged he was conducting exams and writing reports despite not being a QME (having an expired QME Certificate) and submitting bills for cases without disputes.

About $90k in bills were associated with fraudulent activities that the insurers (and, ultimately, the policy holders) had to deal with.

If you’ve got any bills from a Dr. Benjamin Cox, put that checkbook down, as you may want to see when he’s sentenced.

In the meantime, I urge John McGinley, (who, in all fairness, is unlikely to be a particularly avid reader of this blog) to seek damages against the now-convicted Dr. Cox for the damage done to everyone’s favorite Dr. Perry Cox and his fictional reputation.

Straight on to Friday, dear readers!

 

WCAB Rejects “Every Specific Injury is a Violent Act” Theory

Your humble blogger has repeatedly expressed his frustration with the interpretation of Labor code section 4660.1(c)(1) and the “violent act” definition.

Labor Code section 4660.1 provides in pertinent part that you don’t get an increase in permanent disability for compensable consequence psyche claims unless the injury is “catastrophic” (since we don’t have a definition for this term of art, I am imaging a cat that works as an astrophysicist) or being a victim of a violent act or being exposed to a significant violent act.

Did Someone Say Cat Sagan?

Did Someone Say Cat Sagan?

The WCAB took this and ran with it to find that a violent act was just a strong physical blow, and not necessarily one of criminal or quasi-criminal nature.  So, in Larsen v. Securitas Security Services, a 2016 panel decision, a security guard accidentally struck by a car in a parking lot could claim a compensable consequence psyche injury.

The result of this line of thinking is that almost every applicant attorney claims that so long as the injury is not cumulative in nature, but a specific injury, it is, of course, a “violent act” and thus renders 4660.1(c)(1) moot.

Well, not so fast!

Reader D.Z. kindly sent me a recent panel decision in the case of Martin Garcia v. Harvest Church which seems to resist this trend.  (If you, dear reader, would also like this type of very vague and effectively anonymous shout-out, feed your humble blogger your most interesting cases via e-mail!)  Applicant therein claimed a compensable consequence psyche injury after a gate fell on his foot.  Although the left foot claim was accepted, and the psyche compensable consequence was accepted for the purpose of obtaining medical treatment, defendant disputed that the psyche claim entitled applicant to increased permanent disability.

In terms of the mechanism of injury, applicant was working on a gate when it fell on his foot.  Afterwards, applicant went and opened several more gates before reporting what happened to co-workers in the building office.  He declined to be taken to the ER and instead drove home before driving himself to Kaiser, where he underwent surgery the next day.

In rejecting applicant’s claim that the mechanism of injury constituted a violent act, the opinion of the WCAB turned on whether the mechanism of injury was “extreme or intense” comparable to other cases of this sort that did result in such a finding.  The WCAB relied instead on the case of Zarifi v. Group 1 Automotive, where the WCAB held that a violent act did not occur when walking into a glass wall did not result in the loss of consciousness or the need for immediate medical treatment.

In other words, this was not intense enough, neither in the force of the blow or the resulting medical consequences, to qualify as a “violent” act.

What does that mean for us down in the trenches?  There’s a good chance that your slip-and-fall, minor bump, less-serious specific injuries will not qualify for the psyche increase.

It also give incentive for defense attorneys to explore in greater detail the intensity of the blow and bring to a QMEs’ attention first-responder reports “Doctor, how serious was this blow at the time if it yielded these symptoms for the first responders?”

Now, all that being said, your humble blogger is a firm believer that this interpretation of 4660.1 to allow a non-criminal action to be considered a “violent” act is incorrect and defies legislative intent or even the plain meaning of the statute.

As reader W.A. pointed out previously, section 4660.1(c)(2)(A) provides that it’s not just a “violent act” but a “violent act within the meaning of Section 3208.3.”  (Emphasis humbly added).

We’ve had 3208.3 for a while, and there is a veritable Russian novel’s worth of caselaw about what “violent” act triggers 3208.3 psyche injury compensability and defining a “violent act” as a “strong physical blow” is not “within” the meaning of 3208.3 but pretty far outside of it.

Furthermore, this blog has gone on at length about prior treatment of the term by the Court of Appeal.

Unfortunately, this issue, to wit, whether a strong blow can be considered a “violent act” for 4660.1(c) will have to go up to the Court of Appeal or the good folks in Sacramento before it can be brought in line with this blog’s self-important and self-aggrandizing interpretation.

And, when that happens dear readers, I will sing you all a song that will be stuck in your heads forever: “Greg was right, you were wrong, you should have listened all along.”

Another Injured Worker Charged with Insurance and Identity Fraud

Are you excited, dear readers?  It’s the first Friday of 2019 and it appears that no one had as their New Year’s resolution to file a libel or malpractice lawsuit against your humble blogger.  2019 is shaping up to be a pretty great year already!

I bring you the story of an injured worker charged today with felony charges for insurance fraud, perjury, and identity theft after she allegedly filed a claim for an injury sustained prior to commencing work for her employer.

I’m declining to name names became, as yet, there’s no conviction, but WorkCompCentral has an article on this story.

The applicant-turned-criminal-defendant is accused of using someone else’s social security number to file a claim.  She also is alleged to have lied about her start date and when the injury was sustained – the employer and its insurer found 6 prior claims all resolved by way of C&R.

The workers’ comp claim has already been dismissed but the criminal charges remain.

So, here’s a thought your humble blogger has – the application for adjudication of claim form has space, on page 4, where the applicant can declare “other cases have been filed for industrial injuries by this worker as follows:”

Well, often enough we see that part of the application left blank.  But we also see the same applicant attorney representing the same injured worker on claim after claim, yet leaving the field blank.

How could the attorney (or the applicant) sign and file an application that omits the prior claims?  Furthermore, what consequences are there for such an omission?

I’m afraid I haven’t seen many consequences handed out for such practices.  Have you?

As always, dear readers, share your thoughts in the comments or via e-mail to your humble blogger.

Have a great weekend!

COA Sends Defendants A Box of Chocolates: Lindh Revises Apportionment Landscape

And here we are again!  Just when your humble blogger thought he was finally getting a grip on this whole workers’ compensation thing, the rules are changed once more.

The Court of Appeal decision of Lindh has taking the Workers’ Comp world by storm and has sent the otherwise dead and uncaring hearts of defense attorneys from Eureka to San Diego all aflutter.  In the immortal words of Will Smith, “now this is a story all about how [apportionment law] got flipped-turned upside down.”

The basic run down is as follows.  Applicant Lindh was a law enforcement officer in the employ of the City of Petaluma when he sustained an injury to his left eye from several physical blows.  What followed was long headaches and eventual loss of vision in his eye.  His physicians diagnosed a non-industrial condition and opined that the loss of vision was not related to the blows he suffered.

A neuro-ophthalmology QME examined applicant and, among other things, concluded that the blood circulation to his left eye was defective.   However, he noted that if not for the blows, applicant would likely have retained a lot of his vision in that eye, but it was not clear how much.  He may have even gone his whole life without losing vision in his left eye.

The QME then opined that 90% (later adjusted to 85%) of the cause of the loss of vision was his underlying condition and not the physical blows he suffered.

Now, at this point, the parties were in agreement that if the apportionment were to be sustained, applicant would be entitled to 6% PD, while if it did not, then he’d be entitled to 40% PD.  As far as Lindh was concerned, the difference in valuation was about $53,000.  But the stakes were much higher than the scope of Lindh’s concern – how would apportionment be treated in California?

Predictably, the WCAB rejected the apportionment analysis both at the trial level and on reconsideration.  The reasoning was one often relied on – the QME is confusing cause of injury with cause of permanent disability.  As the WCAB reasoned, it doesn’t matter that even 99% of the cause of the injury was non-industrial if the cause of the disability was 100% industrial.  As quoted by the COA: “an opinion that bases apportionment upon the percentage to which non-industrial risk factors contributed to causing the injury is not substantial evidence that legally justifies apportionment.”  The WCJ and the WCAB thus concluded there was no basis for non-industrial apportionment.

Before we get into the Court of Appeal’s reasoning in reversing the WCAB, just picture this scenario – there is a bridge out there that is crossed by thousands of cars every day.  One day, the bridge collapses.  Do we say that the last car to get on (or get off) the bridge is responsible for the collapse?  No, of course not.  But that is the natural extension of “eggshell plaintiff” logic such as this.

In any case, the WCAB provided an extensive history of apportionment reasoning in California workers’ comp law.  Rather than a stroll down memory lane, your humble blogger will jump to the exciting conclusion.  The COA rejected the reasoning that applicant’s pre-existing, relatively dormant condition, had to have been symptomatic to warrant apportionment, citing E.L. Yeager Construction v. WCAB (2006).  It likewise cited ACME Steel, as in that case apportionment to non-industrial hearing loss that had not yet manifested itself was upheld by the COA.

The COA reasoned that the QME in this case did not solely base apportionment on “risk factors” of a condition, but that, instead, testified that in his opinion the analysis happens to be the same for the causation as well as the disability.  The COA relied on the QME’s reasoning that but-for the industrial injury, applicant might not have had any sight loss, but because of the non-industrial injury, the extent of loss of sight was worse that it likely otherwise would have been.

Going further, the COA rejected applicant’s arguments by noting “the post-amendment cases do not require medical evidence that an asymptomatic preexisting condition, in and of itself, would eventually have become symptomatic.  Rather, what is required is substantial medical evidence that the asymptomatic condition or pathology was a contributing cause of the disability.”

The COA reversed the WCAB and ordered a new award reflecting 85% apportionment to pre-existing conditions.

Just a note, dear readers – ages ago, this blog covered the case of Reff v. WCAB, a writ denied opinion in which the WCAB held that a nurse who contracted occupational pneumonia resulting in an aggravation of her pre-existing but dormant genetic disease was not entitled to treatment or PD for that genetic disease.  The WCAB rejected the WCJ’s use of the eggshell plaintiff approach, reasoning that applicant likely would have had a worsening of her non-industrial condition at some point in her life, and the work-related pneumonia only hastened the inevitable.

The other thing to note from the Lindh case, other than the fact that every time I see it I think of those delicious Lindt chocolates, is that the practical approach to apportionment must now be “would there have been less PD if applicant did not have the non-industrial condition?”  If the asymptomatic/dormant condition interacted with the industrial injury to result in greater PD than the industrial condition alone would have caused, then there’s grounds for apportionment.  The fact that the “risk factors analysis” happens to be the same as the PD analysis is NOT a bar to apportionment.

It’s a new year and a new California Workers’ Comp dear readers – or, shall we say, it’s a new year and workers’ comp apportionment is getting closer to what it always should have been?

Happy New Year – Now Some Rates Taking Effect in 2019

Alright my beloved readers – happy new year!

We made it.  It’s 2019.  Who would have thunk the world would still be here, let alone California workers’ comp.  Maybe next year Arnold Schwartzenneger will lead cyborg rebellion to wipe out humanity, or nearly so.  Maybe in 2020 Will Smith will get busy policing robots violating Asimov’s laws.

But as tomorrow morning will see the start of 2019, here’s what we have to deal with now.

California’s minimum wage, effective January 1, 2019, goes up to $11 (per hour) for employers with 25 or fewer employees and $12 for employers with 26 or more employees.  Bear in mind, dear readers, that your local cities or counties might have even higher minimum wage – San Mateo for example, where your humble blogger hangs his hat, is going up to $15 per hour!

This is up from a statewide minimum of $11/hr for 26+ employers and $10.50 for employers with fewer than 26 employees in 2018.

So, if you’re paying TD for an employee who was earning minimum wage, are you going to have to adjust to reflect that employee’s current earning capacity?  In our hearts, we know the answer should be no, but, realistically, you might need to recalculate your TD rate.

Speaking of TD, as the minimum and maximum rate is set by the State Average Weekly Wage for the prior year, the effective rate for 2019 saw a 2.971% increase.  The minimum rate will go up from $182.29 in 2018 to $187.71 in 2019, and a maximum of $1,251.38 for 2019 up from $1,215.27 in 2018.

And, of course, mileage reimbursement goes up from .545 cents per mile to .58 cents per mile.

Although not legislative in nature, California’s laws have been reshaped by some recent high-up court decisions which your humble blogger will revisit in the days to come.

In any case, dear readers, happy new year!